Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
Volume 13, Winter 1998, Issue 2

Article 5

Private Securities Litigation: The Need for Reform
Michael P. Catina
Cindy M. Schmitt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION:
THE NEED FOR REFORM*
INTRODUCTION

Since its inception at the turn of the nineteenth century, securities law in the United States has evolved considerably.' Industrialization and the incorporation of American companies pro* The authors would like to acknowledge that since this Note was submitted for publication, Congress passed H.R. 1689. It was signed into law on Nov. 3, 1998.
1 See James J. Finnerty, III, The "MotherCourt" and the Foreign Plaintiff: Does Rule
10b-5 Reach Far Enough?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 288 (1993) (recognizing 1933 and
1934 Acts as foundation for all securities laws); Dana W. Fox, Foreign Certificatesof Deposit: Securities or Banking Transactions After Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 7
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 435, 435 (1984) (discussing many contributing factors
for beginning securities law); see also Bryen L. Land, Secondary Liability of BrokerDealers in the Ninth Circuit: A Strict Liability Approach, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 879,
890 (1992) (noting that legislative intent of old securities laws is not helpful due to
unique circumstances of time); Ken Nakata, The SEC and Foreign Blocking Statutes:
Need for a Balanced Approach, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 549, 549 (1987) (explaining how
United States security laws are constantly changing in order to keep investment protection at premium); Harvey L. Pitt, Insider Trading and SEC Enforcement: Litigatingand
Settling SEC Insider Trading Enforcement Cases, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1988, at 60
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 358, 1988) (noting that insider trading was not punishable before enactment of federal securities laws).
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vided the foundation for the modern securities market. 2 In an
effort to keep up with growing markets, owners of businesses
3
searched for different methods of raising capital.
The distribution of stocks, through securities trading, became
a common mode of raising this necessary financing. 4 As the securities market grew, however, individual states realized that
they were not equipped to control the fraud and misrepresenta5
tion that developed with the growth of the securities markets.
Consequently, the price of securities escalated to exorbitant levels, ultimately causing the stock market crash of 1929.6 In re2 See Jennifer A. Meyer, Let the Buyer Beware: Economic Modernization, Insurance
Reform and Consumer Protection in China, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2125, 2126 (1994)
(discussing emulation of other nations with regard to securities markets); Bishwambhar
Pyakuryal, The Emerging Securities Market, 9 TRANSNA'L LAW. 421, 424 (1996) (noting
that securities market began with flotation of shares by two companies). But see Michael
McDonough, Comment, Death in One Act: The Case for Company Registration, 24 PEPP.
L. REV. 563, 564 (1997) (stating that companies who helped create modern security markets may lead to its downfall).
3 See David Ackerman, Planningfor Ownership Succission in the Closely Held Business, 3 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 245, 260 (1991) (outlining tremendous amounts of money available in selling stocks); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
"Inaccurate"Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005 (1992) (noting importance of capital in
business competition); John F. Olson, What Makes a Company a Good Candidate for Going Public?, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, at 221, 223 (ALlABA Course of Study No. C951, 1994) (recognizing increased flexibility company enjoys
after raising capital by selling stocks).
4 See Lisa Feiner, Broker-Dealer's Duty to the Market Place, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 783,
790 (1984) (detailing how monetary input allows company to reinvest in additional ventures); Gary R. Trugman, The Value of the Deal, in FIGURING OUT THE DEAL: USING
FINANCIAL INFORMATION To YOUR CLIENTS' ADVANTAGE 1997, at 51 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 977, 1997) (recognizing capital raising ability as key component of business); see also Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso:
The Promise of Universal Capitalism, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 3, 10 (1990) (discussing how security trading is necessary for many companies).
5 See Jennifer D. Antolini, Securities Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 983, 986 (1997).
Material misrepresentation in securities law has a lengthy history in this country. Id.
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets and Fraud On the Market: The Tortured
Transition of JustifiableReliance From Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
671, 674 (1995). The fraud that occurred in the securities industry has similarities to
common law deceit. Id. Christina K. McGlosson, Who Needs Wallstreet? The Dilemma of
Regulating Securities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 305, 305 (1997).
The advent of trading on-line has led to consequences with regard to lack of SEC regulation of this forum. Id. But see Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of
Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 34, 35 (1993). Under current security law there is no cause of action because a security is "overpriced," however,
there is a cause of action if the security is sold with misleading information. Id.
6 See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 101 (1991) (explaining that feverish
anticipation and desire to get rich led to crash of 1929); see also Dana Atwood Lukens,
Regulation for the Securities Markets? 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 379, 384 (1991) (noting
that Congress had to change many laws after crash of 1929); David Ross, Should the Law
Prohibit "Manipulation"in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 504 (1991)
(noting that fraud certainly did not end after stock market crash).
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sponse to this economic catastrophe, Congress passed reform
legislation in an attempt to protect both investors and compa7
nies.
Despite Congress' good intentions, the newly enacted legislation failed to combat the frivolous claims brought against companies. 8 Congress again attempted to find a remedy, this time
through the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 9 The PSLRA was intended to prevent meritless claims against companies in federal class action
lawsuits by placing procedural hurdles that must be overcome. 10
Unfortunately, this piece of legislation has also fallen short of
7 See Lawrence D. McCabe, Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program TradingManipulative as Defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 207,
209 (1993) (discussing earlier part of this century when three stock market crashes
brought about serious investigation into operation of securities market).
8 See D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching an
Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK L. REV. 593, 615 (1995) (discussing how fighting even
most frivolous claims gets expensive); see also James Hamilton, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in DERIVATIVES 1996: AVOIDING THE RISK AND MANAGING THE
LITIGATION 1996, at 565 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 932,
1996) (noting that small companies face great start-up difficulties because of frivolous
claims); William S. Lerach, Prevalence and Economic Impact of Securities Class Actions:
Is Reform Necessary?, in AVOIDING AND MANAGING SECURITIES LITIGATION AND SEC
ENFORCEMENT INQUIRIES FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 1995, at 20 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 888, 1995) (explaining how it may be cost effective to settle

out of court).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997). The bill provides in relevant part:
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions...
(2) Required state of mind... In any private action arising under this chapter in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
Id. 141 CONG. REC. H14039-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley). This
statute combats frivolous claims by placing the hurdle on plaintiffs of proving the defendant's state of mind. Id.
10 See Securities Litigation Abuses, 1997: Before the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
Richard I. Miller, General Counsel, AICPA), available in 1997 WL 416660, at *3. The Reform Act also included:
[a] reform of joint and several liability to reduce coercive settlements; prohibitions on
abusive practices to prevent the payment of bounties to lead plaintiffs and other such
abuses; and toughened attorney sanctioned provisions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule I 1 to discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits.
Id.; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Symposium: Securities Law After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act-Unfinished Business, 50 SMU L. REV. 9, 9 (1996) (examining
PSLRA's provisions and in-depth analysis of variety of securities fraud issues); Lori
Tripoli, For Securities Practices,Opportunity Has Knocked Twice, 16 No. 2 OF COUNSEL
7, 7 (1997) (noting nature of PSLRA in limiting liability); Amy Neeno, Corporate Counsel
1995 Highlights: Bigger Big Companies, Smaller Big Government and Major Securities
Reform Becomes Law, West's Legal News, Jan. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 257779, at
*5 (establishing PSLRA as predominant securities law in 1990's).
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meeting its objective, thus giving rise to the need for additional
remedial legislation. 11
There are currently two securities reform bills pending in
Congress addressing the problem of frivolous claims. 1 2 The primary purpose of these bills is to prevent forum shopping in securities class action lawsuits. 13 By preventing forum shopping,
the restrictions and qualifications imposed at the federal level by
the PSLRA 14 will have a chance to be universally applied. 15 If
either of these proposed bills are passed, thereby preempting
state regulation of class action securities lawsuits, the goals of
16
the PSLRA will be carried out.
This Note focuses on the need for reform legislation in the securities market due to the increase in forum shopping among the
nation's states. Part One discusses the history of securities legII See Dennis J. Block et. al., Selected Developments Concerning the Federal Securities Laws and in the Market for Corporate Control, in 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON

SECURITIES REGULATION 1995, at 290 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 908, 1995) (criticizing many practical aspects of PSLRA); Jill N. Willis, The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Friend or Foe of the Investor?, 47 FLA. L. REV.
841, 843 (1995) (noting that Act did not fully restore liability of aiders and abettors in
security fraud cases).
12 See All Eyes on FinancialServices Reform, Revamping CEA is Long Shot, Securities Regulation and Law Report, Jan. 16, 1998, available in 30 SRLR 89, at *2. The predictions are that the pending litigation reform will require some securities class actions
to be filed in federal rather than state court. Id.
13 See What We Know and Don't Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Before the Subcomm. on Finance and HazardousMaterials of the Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. (1997) (written testimony of Michael A. Perino, Stanford Law
School), available in 1997 WL 662283, at *44 (illustrating that these bills intend to prevent attorneys from circumventing heightened federal standards); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
267, 276 (1996) (summarizing sanctions given to attorneys who forum shop).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, z-2, and §§ 78j-1, u-4, u-5 (1997).
15 See Paul H. Dawes, Pleading Motions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1995, at 59 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 958, 1995) (noting that standardizing certain procedural aspects of
PSLRA cut down on plaintiffs' ability to forum-shop); Bruce G. Vanyo et. al., Securities
Class Action Litigation in State Courts, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 321 (PLI Corp.

L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 958, 1996) (discussing importance of unified
restrictions in security proceedings). But see William S. Lerach, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 - 20 Months Later, Securities Class Action Litigation Under the
PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, "A Brave New World" in SECURITIES LITIGATION
1997, at 25 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1015, 1997)
(outlining many important advantages state courts have over federal courts).
16 See Richard Walker et. al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles,
State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 643, 646 (1997) (claiming Reform Act has some effect on
reducing federal securities class action suits); Dylan McGrath, Firm's Back Litigation
Bill, Electronic News, Oct. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12485373, at *2-4 (supporting
enactment of securities legislation). But see Lerach, supra note 15, at 26 (stating that if
provision preempting state regulation was attached, PSLRA would not have had enough
votes to override Clinton's veto).
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islation beginning with the stock market crash of 1929. This
section also includes a commentary on the post-PSLRA era. Part
Two addresses proposed remedial legislation and its attempts to
effectuate the PSLRA. Finally, this Note concludes by endorsing
the preemption of securities class action lawsuits by virtue of a
uniform standard for securities litigation.
I. HISTORY
A. The Outset of Securities Reform
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") 17 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") 18 to promote
investor confidence and regulate the American stock market after the crash of 1929.19 The public's investment in the securities
market is crucial for capital formation, economic growth and increased employment. 20 Congress, therefore, with the assistance
of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), created the
21
first securities legislation.
Congress enacted the 1933 Act to ensure that publicly traded
companies fully disclosed material information to prospective investors. 2 2 Since its enactment, Congress has succeeded in
regulating activity between corporations and their potential in17 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1997).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1997).
19 See Lukens, supra note 6, at 384 (noting that both 1933 and 1934 Acts were responses to stock market crash of 1929).
20 See McGlosson, supra note 5, at 305. There is a need for capital investments for a
corporation to survive. Id.; see also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 170 (1994). The Supreme Court noted that the stock market crash
of 1929, in conjunction with reports of widespread abuse in the securities industry,
prompted the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id.; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
21 See Kelly Testy, The Capital Markets in Transition: Response to New SEC Rule
144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233, 240 (1990) (complementing SEC's ability to rise up from stock
market crash and enjoy fifty successful years as Wall Street's watchdog); Mark Weibel,
Federal Securities Arbitration:Does it Provide Adequate Relief?, 48 ARB. J. 54, 55 (Mar.
1993) (discussing premise for 1933 Act, namely, investors do not have as much knowledge as issuers).
22 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (according to Supreme
Court, 1933 Act designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information, to protect investors from fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealings); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
(stating that 1933 Act was one of series of enactments designed to respond to securities
industry abuses found to have contributed to stock market crash of 1929 and depression
of 1930's).
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vestors. 2 3 Congress, however, failed to extend these regulations
to individual third parties trading amongst themselves. 2 4 To
25
rectify its omission Congress enacted the 1934 Act.
This subsequent Act gave the SEC broad regulatory and enforcement powers. 26 The filing of private actions by investors
against corporations for violations of federal securities law was
also permitted by the 1934 Act. 27 The most common provisions
23 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1996) (enumerating fiduciary duties
to be protected by SEC acts); James Harlan Koenig, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market
for Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1022
(1989) (explaining that underlying reason for 1933 Act is to provide investors with more
information).

24 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 561 (1995) (holding 12(2) of the Securities Act is limited to public offerings of securities and does not reach private sales or secondary market trading); McGlosson, supra note 5, at 305 (giving overview of 1933 and
1934 Acts and their relationship with initial public offerings); see also Laura M. Brower,
Structure and Price: Striking a Delicate Balance in Tender Offer Negotiations, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 987, 991 (1987) (explaining that companies abused provisions of 1933 Act
and easily got around requirements); Fred Knopf, Using Federal Magistratesto Resolve
Securities Disputes: A Viable Alternative, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 537, 538 (1992) (noting
that 1934 Act attempts to fill gaps left in 1933 Act). But see Nancy Staudt, "Controlling"

Securities Fraud: Proposed Liability Standardsfor Controlling Persons Under the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts, 72 MINN. L. REV. 930, 934 (1988) (noting that enactment of acts
has not come close to proving fraud on securities market).

25 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1997). The preamble of the 1934 Act states its purpose as, among
other things, providing for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets, and to prevent inequitable and unfair practices in the markets.
26 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987)
(emphasizing that 1975 amendments to section 19 of 1934 Act continued to give broad
powers to regulate yet more aspects of securities law, including arbitration); Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 713 (1980) (explaining that 1934 Act granted commission broad
authority to seek enforcement without regarding scienter unless criminal punishments
are contemplated); C. Steven Bradford, The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action
For Proxy Fraud:The ParallelBetween Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REV. 306, 313 (1991)
(illustrating broad regulatory and enforcement powers of 1934 Act via analysis of case
law).
27 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 427 (1964) (holding section 27 of 1934 Act

established implied private right of action); see also Gregory W. Ladner, CorporateLawDeveloping Uniformity in Limitations Periods for Implied PrivateActions Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1994) (discussing implied private
right and how it varies throughout courts); John J. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(B): In Defense of Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 811 (1982)
(analyzing corporate rights of action and investor rights of action under 1933 and 1934
Acts).

28 See David C. Mahaffey, Pleading Standards and Discovery Stays Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: An End to FishingExpeditions?, 10 NO. 2 INSIGHTS
9, 9 (1996) (discussing PSLRA's purpose of eliminating so-called 'fishing expedition' lawsuits, in which plaintiffs file complaints containing general allegations of fraud hoping
that subsequent discovery will uncover evidence to substantiate allegations); see also

Miller, supra note 10, at *8 (addressing concern over plaintiffs lawyers using discovery
proceedings in state courts as "fishing expeditions" for simultaneously filed federal court
suits); CoalitionApplauds Senate Bill to Crack Down on Speculative Stock Suits in State
Courts, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 10, 1997, available in WL 13913497, at *2 (stating law
firms that specialize in "strike suits" were often filing them without any evidence of
wrongdoing in attempt to extract settlements from companies).
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utilized for such lawsuits were the "catch-all" fraud provision in
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. 2 8 Although
Congress never expressly provided for such private rights of action when it enacted section 10(b), the judiciary held that Con29
gress impliedly authorized such actions.
B. The Need for Reform
While the 1933 and 1934 Acts sought to protect investors from
corporate deception, the need for legislation to protect corporations from unscrupulous investors soon became evident. 30 Many
investors filed meritless fraud claims and "strike suits" 3 1 against
companies
due to the broad scope of section 10(b) and rule
32
10(b)(5).

29 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765 (1975) (describing
broad powers of 1934 Act specifically in regard to 10(b)). See generally Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (explaining that since 10(b) is not explicit in its
terms, courts should be careful in construing it).
30 See James Hamilton, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in DERIVATIVES 1996: AVOIDING THE RISK AND MANAGING THE LITIGATION, at 487 (PLI Corp. L.

and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 932, 1996) (discussing why some believe this
implied right has left judges free to develop conflicting legal standards concerning 10 b5); Dennis Scholl, An Implied Right of Action Under 17(A): The Supreme Court Has Said
No, But is Anybody Listening?, 36 MIAMI L. REV. 41, 42 (1980) (recognizing that lob-5
does have limited private cause of action). But see Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity:
The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10 B-5 Cases, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1642
(1993) (noting that Rule 10 b-5 has scienter requirement, but does not have statute of
repose).
31 See 141 CONG. REC. H14039-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
(amending titles 1 of both 1933 and 1934 Acts by adding section 27 and section 21(d) respectively after 21(c)); see also Lawrence D. McCabe, Happy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of
Securities Regulation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 207, 229 (1993) (explaining that Congress
aimed to protect investors from traders who attempted to manipulate markets); cf. Josh
Futterman, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulations Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor
Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
806, 809 (1995) (noting that some off shore accounts are used by deceitful investors to
beat regulatory system).
32 See Curt Cutting, Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will CongressionalReforms Protect Small Corporations?,56 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 556 n.4 (1995). Frivolous suits are suits
in which the plaintiff is successful although, if the case were brought to trial, it is unlikely that the party would prevail on the merits. Id.; John L. Latham et. al., Securities
Regulation, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1463, 1494 (1995). In such actions the plaintiff is able to
obtain a favorable settlement, even though the case would not likely win on the merits at
trial. Id.; Stephen M. Muniz, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Protecting CorporationsFrom Investors, Protecting Investors From Corporations, and Promoting Market Efficiency, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 655, 702 (1997). A strike suit is a class
action suit by shareholders against a company because its stock price dropped. Id.; see
also 141 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (Statement of Sen. D'Amato).
"[Strike] suits.., are often based on nothing more than a company's announcement of
bad news, not evidence of fraud." Id.
33 See William S. Feinstein, Securities Fraud,63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 851, 864 (1995)
(discussing origin and reasons for a "strike suit"); David Waksmen, Causation Concerns
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Strike suits are class action suits brought by investors under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint is based upon the
allegation that the defendant company used fraudulent or mis33
leading statements to induce customers to purchase securities.
These suits have historically generated much controversy due to
the potential for abuse. 34 Strike suits are feared because of the
stigma attached to defendants charged with violations of the
1934 Act. 3 5 A company that relies on investor confidence cannot
afford the consequences associated with public accusations that
36
it engaged in deceptive practices.
Frivolous claims are even a greater nuisance for corporations
due to the prior knowledge by plaintiffs that the companies
37
usually settle because of the high cost of pre-trial discovery.
For example, there was a period in which companies and their
in Civil Conspiracy to Violate Rule 10B-5, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1525 (1991)
(discussing widespread use of strike suits). See generally Carol J. Sulcoski, Looking a Gift
of Shock in the Mouth: Donative Transfer Rule and 10 B-5, 88 MICH. L. REV. 604, 614
(1989) (noting Supreme Court's concern about strike suits).
34 See New England Data Serv. Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1987)
(noting that plaintiff with groundless claim can wreak havoc on company); see also Natash, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing
that attorney's costs are additional obstacle in strike suits). See, e.g., Haft v. Eastland
Fin. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (D.R.I. 1991) (stating that corporate defendants settle
strike suits in order to preserve good will).
35 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (observing
that strike suits cause social costs rather than benefits due to their stigma); Valerie Lee
Litwin, Pleading Constructive Fraud in Securities Litigation - Avoiding Dismissal for
Failure to Plead With Particularity,33 EMORY L.J. 517, 546 (1984) (noting that strike
suits should be discouraged because they represent meritless claims, yet plaintiffs still
get settlement money because of social stigma of trial); see also J. Spencer Schuster, Precertificationof Class Actions: Will CaliforniaFollow the FederalLead?, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
863, 864 (1989) (discussing strong policy reasons defendant corporation has for settling
strike suits early).
36 See Lerach, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that bad press costs company); Alan S.
Ritchie, The Proposed "Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act" The Introduction of
ProportionateLiability in Rule 10b-5 Litigation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 341 (1994)
(discussing proposed changes that Congress is initiating in order to deter strike suits).
37 See David Waksman, Causation Concerns in Civil Conspiracy to Violate Rule lOb5, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1509 (1991) (noting tremendous discovery costs in security
litigation cases); cf. Lance Levine, Compliance With GAAP and GAAS: Its Proper Use as
an Accountant's Defense in a Rule 10B-5 Suit, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 126 (1993)
(discussing other entities, such as accounting firms, which are also exposed to strike
suits).
38 See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 566 (recognizing some positive aspects of punishing
executives who issue reckless promises); see also George G. Yearsich et. al., Securities
Law Aspects of Partnerships,in PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND LLPS, at 965, 997 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study No. CA86, 1996) (discussing some safe harbor provisions for forward
looking statements). But see Martha L. Cochran, Sweeping Reform: Litigation and Bespeaking Caution Under the New Securities Law, in APPENDICES, at 141 (PLI Corp. L.
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 924, 1996) (noting that well thought out forward looking statements are essential to companies' success).
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executives were being sued after providing the public with forward looking statements. 3 8 A statement is characterized as
"forward looking" when it discloses anything that is not a current or historical fact. 39 Investors proceeded to claim that forward looking statements were fraudulent if the future projec40
tions failed to materiahze.
These suits were often filed by parties lacking any actual evidence of fraud.4 1 The plaintiffs often used pre-trial discovery
proceedings to go on "fishing expeditions" to substantiate their
claims. 42 Due to the high cost of discovery incurred by companies out of court, settlements were usually favored. 4 3 Motivated
39 Harvey L. Pitt, Esq., Address at the St. John's University School of Law Securities
Law Association Lecture (Feb. 10, 1998) (explaining rationale behind PSLRA and its effects since 1995).
40 See Phillip D. Parker, The New Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, in
SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER NEW SECURITIES LAW

1996, at 319 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Handbook Series No. 925, 1996) (discussing perspective of issuers who are held accountable for any prediction that does not completely
come to fruition); see also Erin M. Hartke, What's Wrong With the Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements? A Call to the SEC to Reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks
Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 133, 134 (1993) (suggesting that some investors sue
under forward looking statement pretense in order to recover for substantial personal
loss).
41 See Herbert S. Wanders, Developments in Securities Law Disclosure, in ADVANCED
SECURITIES LAWS WORKSHOP 1997, at 11 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 1005, 1997) (citing strong growth in class action lawsuits against executives
who issue forward looking statements).
42 See Mahaffey, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing PSLRA's intention of eliminating
'fishing expedition' lawsuits, where party files complaint containing general allegations
of fraud in hopes that subsequent discovery will uncover enough evidence to substantiate
allegations); see also Miller, supra note 10, at *8 (addressing concern over plaintiffs lawyers using discovery proceedings in state courts as "fishing expeditions" for simultaneously filed federal court suits); U.S. Newswire, supra note 28, at *2 (pinpointing certain
firms which specialize in strike suits in order to coerce companies to settle without any
evidence).
43 See Richard M. Phillips et. al., The PSLRA of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks
and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009,
1012 (1996). "Suits like Phillip Morris appeared to be initiated solely in the hope that
some basis for them might be developed in the discovery process." Id.; see also Miller,
supra note 10, at *2-3. The testimony explains that the cost of discovery often caused
companies to settle securities class actions regardless of their merit. Id.; Joel W. Skinner
et. al., Discovery Stays, Lead Plaintiffs and the Fraud on the Market Theory: Observations on the PSLRA and Recommendations for Change, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997,

at 340 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1015, 1997). The journal
describes how limited discovery in state proceedings may still be used to substantiate
claims. Id. Randall S. Thomas et. al., Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in
FederalSecurities FraudActions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 78 (1997). The author describes the
effect of the Reform Act on discovery procedures. Id.
44 See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 717, 721 (1996) (describing settlement out of court as common occurrence). See,
e.g., Julie Faussie, Limiting Liability in Public Accounting Suits: A Desperate Appeal
from a Beleaguered Profession, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1994) (describing how
many accounting firms settle out of court because of cost of extending litigation).
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by fear of possible strike suits, companies refused to disclose information to the public. 44 This negatively effected the securities
market 4 5 since companies ceased to provide valuable information
to the public.

46

In response to this problem, Congress enacted a "safe harbor"
provision 47 designed to protect corporations from claims based
on their future projections by prohibiting lawsuits based upon
them. 48 There are two exceptions to the safe harbor provisions.
45 See McGrath, supra note 16, at *2 (stating threat of being sued in state court has
caused companies to be reserved with respect to providing investors with forward-looking
information). See generally Feinstein, supra note 33, at 864 (explaining companies fear
of strike suits); Muniz, supra note 32, at 660-61 (1997) (describing how strike suits limit
information disclosed by corporated management).
46 See Miller, supra note 10, at *1-3 (explaining that abusive litigation drains even
our countries most lucrative companies of their resources along with compromising integrity of securities market). See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement, Division of Enforcement-Recent Cases and Issues, in THE SEC
SPEAKS IN 1997, at 199-200 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 978,
1997) (describing sharing of market information as personal courtesy); Mark A. Clayton,
The MisappropriationTheory in Light of Carpenter and the Insider Tradingand Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 215 (1984) (explaining that
duty to disclose is especially owed in impersonal securities market); McGrath, supra note
16, at *2-4 (discussing many harms suffered by those in securities market as result of
strike suits).
47 See Steven J. Spencer, Has Congress Learned Its Lesson? A Plain Meaning Analysis of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, 111
(1997). Corporations may be discouraged from issuing critical market information needed
by investors to make informed decisions because of their fear of opened-ended liability.
Id.; see also J. Robert Brown Jr., CorporateSecrecy, The FederalSecurities Laws, and the
Disclosureof Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 154 (1986). Investors are deprived of material information when companies follow a policy of non-disclosure. Id.;
James Harlan Reenig, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1061 (1989). The author explains
that if investors cannot rely on total disclosure of accurate statements they will be less
likely to invest. Id. See generally Dale E. Barnes Jr. et. al., Great Expectations: Risk
Management Through Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 155, 165 (1994). The
author gives a good analysis of duty to disclose material information and what sort of information is described as material. Id.
48 See generally Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities Litigation Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND
BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAWS 1996, at 616 (PLI Corp. L. and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 923, 1996) (describing 1974 safe harbor legislation);
Paul H. Dawes, PleadingMotions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 48 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 958, 1996) (explaining adoption of safe harbor for forward looking statements);
Noelle Matteson, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Do Issuers Still Get
Soaked in the Safe Harbor,27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 527, 538 (1997) (describing trend
toward safe harbor provisions). But see Thomas Gilroy et. al., Preparingthe Management's Discussion and Analysis, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS
1995, at 305 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 874, 1995)
(explaining weakness of safe harbor provision).
49 See Alan K. Austin, Risk Factors Disclosure and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, in SECURITIES FILINGS 1996, at 683 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 960, 1996) (describing safe harbor provision proposed by conference
committee); John F. Olson et. al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
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First, actions may be instituted based on future statements
made "without a reasonable basis." 49 The second exception allows plaintiffs to file suit when corporate disclosure is made in
bad faith. 5 0 As a result of the limited scope of this provision,
Congress' attempt at a safe harbor was ineffective in protecting
corporations. 5 1
C. The Legislature'sResponse- The PrivateSecurities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995
In an attempt to effectuate this safe harbor provision, Congress enacted the PSLRA. 52 While the PSLRA mainly focused on
and the "Bespeaks Caution"Doctrine, in SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING
CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW 1996, at 583 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 923, 1996) (explaining how "safe harbor" provision will enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward looking information); see also Wanders, supra note 41, at 266 (referring to Congress'efforts to amend
safe harbor provision); Muniz, supra note 32, at 657 (1997) (explaining that fraud claims
based upon future projections were aimed to be eliminated by 1979 safe harbor provision).
50 See Muniz, supra note 32, at 655 (laying out exceptions to safe harbor provisions);
see also Douglas M. Schwab et. al., An Update on CongressionalActions to Reform the
Federal Securities Laws, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1995, at 492-93 (PLI Corp. L. and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 905, 1995) (stating times when "safe harbor" provisions are not applicable). But see Allen I. Young, Disclosures ConcerningDerivativeFinancial Instruments, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1995, at 266 (PLI Corp.
L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 969, 1997) (explaining when safe harbor
provisions are available).
51 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Private Securities LitigationReform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung?, in 28TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 1996, at 534-35 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 963,
1996) (stating that failure to disclose certain type of forward looking statement may be
material omission giving rise to further liability); Cutting, supra note 32, at 579
(explaining that safe harbor provides little protection for predictions gone sour); see also
Thomas Gilray et. al., Preparing the Management's Discussion and Analysis, in
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 1995, at 309 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 874, 1995) (stating in order to be protected, statements
must have adequate basis in fact as well as be issued in good faith).
52 See Muniz, supra note 32, at 679. In 1995, Congress, attempted to strengthen the
safe harbor provision by overriding President Clinton's veto, and passing into law the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 40, at
387. There is a need for a stronger safe harbor than currently exists because the current
rules are ineffective. Id.; Stephen J. Schulte et. al., Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements: An Overview for the Practitioner, in SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND
BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAWS 1996, at 462 (PLI Corp. L. and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 923, 1996). Part I of the Safe Harbor provision has
proven to be ineffective. Id.; Carl W. Schneider et. al., Forward Looking InformationNavigatingin the Safe Harbor, 51 BUS. LAW. 1070, 1079 (1996). These authors also state
that presently, the safe harbor rules are relatively ineffective. Id.
53 See David M. Brodsky, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Principal
Provisions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 1265 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 958, 1996). The major provisions of the Reform Act concern a safe
harbor for forward looking statements. Id.; Martha L. Cochran et. al., The Private Securi-
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meritless strike suits, 5 3 the final bill extends far beyond the
54
regulation of frivolous litigation.
The PSLRA established uniform pleading standards among
federal courts. 5 5 Prior to its enactment, courts were inconsistent
in deciding what was necessary to successfully plead fraud in securities cases. 5 6 Under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, plaintiffs
had to plead specific facts that supported "a strong inference of
scienter." 57 Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, plaintiffs had to "plead fraud with particularity,"58 while "malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
the mind [could be] averred [to] generally." 59 The disparity beties Litigation Reform Act Overview Summary and New Developments, in 28TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1996, at 188 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 962, 1996). Increasing numbers of companies have begun to utilize
the Reform Act's safe harbor for forward looking statements. Id.; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Futureof the PSLRA, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 997 (1996). Safe harbor is one of the main provisions of the PSLRA. See generally 141 CONG. REC. H15214-06 (daily ed. Dec, 20, 1995)
(veto message of President Clinton). The President vetoed the bill because he felt the
pleading standards were to stringent. Id.
54 See Jeffrey Silva, Lawmakers Bring to FloorNew Securities Litigation (RCR Radio
Comm. Report, May 26, 1997), available in 1997 WL 8324672, at *2. The "PSLRA was
designed to cut down the filing of frivolous lawsuits by shareholders in high tech companies who's stock prices are prone to big jumps and declines." Id.; see also John W. Avery,
Securities Litigation Reform, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 348 (1996). Chairmen Levitt indicated
that the SEC supported efforts to make private securities litigation more effective and to
deter meritless lawsuits. Id.
55 See Marksman Partners v. Chantel Pharm., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Ca.
1996) (indicating committee intended to create uniform pleading standard); see also Joseph P. Monteleone et. al., D & 0 Developments, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 1019
(PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 958, 1996) (indicating PSLRA
was designed to protect investors, issuers, and all associated with capital markets from
abusive securities litigation); Spencer, supra note 47, at 100 (stating that PSLRA intended to discourage discovery abuses, targeting deep pocket defendants and client manipulation by attorneys in addition to frivolous litigation).
56 See McGrath, supra note 16, at *2-3 (explaining that proposed legislation is an effort to supplement Reform Act and uphold goal of uniformity).
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1997). Under rule 10(b) of the 1934 Act, plaintiffs must
plead specific facts that would support "a strong inference of scienter." Id.; FED. R. CIV.
P. 9(b). Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, plaintiffs must
"plead fraud with particularity" though "malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of the mind may be averred generally." Id.
58 See In re Glen Fed, Inc. Securities Litigation v. Glenfed Inc. 11 F.3d. 843, 847 (9th
Cir. 1993) (looking at pleading standard for fraud in securities cases); see also Joseph A.
Grundfest et. al., Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience, in ADVANCED
SECURITIES LAws WORKSHOP 1997, at 382 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 1005, 1997) (discussing pleading standards under rule 10(b)); Survey, Subcomm. on Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw.
717, 761 (1995) (examining pleading requirements for securities cases under Federal
Rule 9(b) & Rule 10(b) of 1934 Act).
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
60 See id.; see also, William S. Lerach et. al., Pleading Scienter Under Section 21 D
(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 905 (1996)
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tween the two regulations allowed some circuit courts to be more
lenient than others in their requirements for pleading scienter in
60
fraud cases.
The different interpretations of section 10(b) and rule 9(b) created confusion among the circuits. 6 1 The standard adopted by
the PSLRA mirrored the section 10(b) approach. Thus, in order
to bring a securities action in federal court the complaint must
specifically set forth facts which give "rise to a strong inference
62
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."
The PSLRA also prevented liability for statements made by
company representatives that were not known to be false at the
time they were made, or that were accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements. 6 3 Additionally, the PSLRA provided a

(discussing Federal Rule 9(b)).
61 See In re Stac Electronics Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that claims brought under Rule 10(b) must meet particularity requirements of Federal
Rule 9(b)); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995) (only acts constituting fraud need be stated with particularity in accordance with 9(b) while scienter
may be generally averred); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992)
(observing that "plain language [of Rule 9(b)] clearly encompasses section 11 and section
12(2) claims based on fraud"); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5
(10th Cir. 1989) (noting that many courts and commentators have interpreted Rule 9(b)
to permit general averment of intent unaccompanied by supporting factual allegations).
62 See In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (using standard of
pleading fraud under rule 10(b) of 1934 Act); see also Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.,
941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying rule 9b test for scienter).
63 See Patrick J. Coughlin et. al, Commencing Litigation Under the PrivateSecurities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 15 (PLI Corp. L. and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7165, 1996). The Conference Committee Report
on the PSLRA indicates that the statutory language is based on the [heightened] pleading standard of the Second Circuit, thus adopting the heightened standard that plaintiffs
plead both factual circumstances constituting fraud as well as scienter with particularity.
Id. But see Hearings on Securities Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Financeof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1994) (statement of Prof. Arthur Miller). The heightened scienter standards attempt to attain the unrealistic goal of having plaintiffs provide clear proof of the defendant's state of mind. Id. It is rare to find that this type of evidence exits. Id. Most cases
require plaintiffs to draw inferences from the facts available prior to institution of the
action. Id. Should these facts be unavailable, meeting these requirements would be impossible. Id.; Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner'sView of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 324 (1997). The PSLRA is unclear as to what is
needed to establish a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of
mind. Id. The Report of Managers explicitly stated that the Congressional Conference
Committee did not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law on this respect. Id. In
fact, Congress rejected an amendment that would have codified the Second Circuit approach. Id.
64 See Latham, supra note 32, at 1479-80 (explaining protection was afforded to
identify forward looking statements accompanied by meaningful precautionary statements); see also Matteson, supra note 48, at 534 (indicating safe harbor protected statements made in good faith).
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64
stay on discovery during the pendency of a dismissal motion.
The discovery provision was intended to end the "fishing expeditions" used to substantiate frivolous claims. 6 5 Despite the goals
of the PSLRA, the fact remains that it is only applicable at the
federal level leaving the states in limbo as to what the appropri66
ate standard should be.

D. The Aftermath of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995
Although the PSLRA appeared to address legislative concerns, 6 7 a loophole has enabled attorneys to continually initiate
frivolous and meritless lawsuits that Congress clearly intended
to bar. 6 8 Since the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA
only apply in federal courts, 69 attorneys are filing suit in state
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997). See generally Patricia Avery, et.al, To Stay or
Not to Stay, in SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE

NEW SECURITIES LAW 1996, at 178 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B4-7152, 1996) (describing state provision of PSLRA of 1995); John Olson, et. al,
PleadingReform, PlaintiffQualificationand Discovery Stays Under Reform Act, 51 BUS.
LAW. 1101, 1134 (1996) (explaining that prior to enactment of PSLRA, discovery stays
were rarely granted).
66 See Martha L. Cochran, Sweeping Reform: Litigating and Bespeaking Caution Under the New Securities Law, in DERIVATIVES 1996: AVOIDING THE RISK AND MANAGING

THE LITIGATION, at 41 (PLI Corp. L and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7137,
1996) (highlighting provisions of act allowing stays of discovery); see also James Hamilton, Appendices, in PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 535 (PLI
Corp. L and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1996) (discussing PSLRA's
hopes of preventing fishing expeditions).
67 See Rice, supra note 63, at 283 (explaining PSLRA's applicability at federal level);
see also Joel W. Sternman et. al., Discovery Stays Lead Plaintiffs and the Fraud on the
Market Theory: Observations on the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 and
Recommendations For Change, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 333 (PLI Corp. L and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (noting that PSLRA's non applicability at state level has increased state litigation).
68 See Chimicles, supra note 48, at 593 (stating that there is much speculation about
future of securities litigation in wake of PSLRA); Harvey Pitt et. al., Promises Made,
Promises Kept: PracticalImplications of PSLRA, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845, 866 (1996)
(explaining how questions arise concerning interpretation of PSLRA); Michael S. Radford, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Retroactive Application, 23 J.
LEGIS. 283, 283 (1997) (describing confusion over whether PSLRA was meant to be retroactive).
69 See New 'Safe Harbor' is Not Being Utilized, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 1996, at S29
(stressing that issuers are continuing to release same type of information prior to Reform
Act, but these statements do not conform with requirements for safe harbor protection);
see also Amendments Proposed to Plug Loophole in Securities Reform Laws, ANDREWS
SEC AND COMMODITIES LITIG. REP., June 11, 1997, at 12 (explaining new legislation
needed to fill holes in PSLRA). See generally Sternman, supra note 67, at 333 (noting
that Congress has taken consideration of loopholes in PSLRA and begun to address
them); Lori Tripoli, PracticeDevelopment Saga, 16 NO.2 OF COUNSEL 5, 5 (1997) (stating
states have discovered ways around application of statute).
70 See Stuart J. Baskin, Recent Developments in State Securities, Derivativeand Cor-
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courts where the heightened standards do not apply. 70 The result has been an explosion of securities litigation in state
courts.

71

A recent study reveals that securities class action lawsuits in
state courts have increased by twenty-six percent since 1995.72
The PSLRA has essentially been rendered ineffective due to the
ability of claimants to side-step the heightened requirements by
filing in state court. 7 3 In response, companies are once again
porate Law, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 449 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7165, 1996). The article talks about changes in federal courts
because of PSLRA, but not in state courts. Id.; see also Monteleone, supra note 55, at
1020. Comment states that PSLRA heightens pleading standards in federal courts. Id.
71 See Miller, supra note 10, at *8 (reiterating that cases that did not meet standards
of federal court were still being filed in state courts bringing about same "coercive pressure to settle meritless claims that Congress sought to eliminate"); see also Keith
Fleischman, Class Action Suits and the Effect of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, in ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY, at 485, 488 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. SB70,
1997) (stating that nationwide class actions may be brought in federal and state courts);
Alan Hornich, Single Court Solutions, 11 No. 6 INSIDE LITIG. 9, 13 (1997) (noting securities class actions are on rise in state courts). See generally Scott Biler, JudicialInterpretation of Certain ProceduralAspects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 905-06 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (describing how PSLRA was intended to create uniformity among circuits); Luther Zeigler et. al., Honoring State Class Action Settlements, 10
NO. 4 INSIGHTS 2, 4 (1996) (stating that Reform Act effected substantial modifications to
federal securities law).
72 See Concerning the Implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995: Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. 21
(1997) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC), available in 1997 WL 654428, at *32
(pointing out that commentators feel that PSLRA has led to "migration of cases to state
court where federal reforms do not apply"); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A.
Perino, Ten Things We Don't Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 1035 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997). See generally Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration:
Towards a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 575 (1997)
(describing that wave of reform acts' procedural requirements provide "magic bullet"
since claims in state courts are on rise); Randall S. Thomas et. al., Using State Inspection
Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 64, 69 (1997)
(implying that PSLRA was meant to apply only in federal court); Ronald L. Mariner et.
al., Operating in the New World of Securities Reform, 10 No. 10 INSIGHTS 3, 5 (1996)
(describing how PSLRA clarified pleading standards among circuit courts).
73 See Miller, supra note 10, at *5-6. "The uncertainty, cost, and potential exposure of
state court litigation force companies to act as if the federal reforms were never passed
and deny investors the benefits that Congress intended to provide." Id. See generally
Hamilton, supra note 66, at 566. The introduction of safe harbor provisions will hurt the
market by protecting fraudulent statements. Id.; Phillips, supra note 43, at 1030. The
author describes how security suits hurt the market by lowering cash flow in corporations. Id.
74 See Spencer, supra note 47, at 111 (stating that protections afforded under PSLRA
should encourage companies to disclose information to the public). But see Edward W.
Ritch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 887
(1995) (describing companies having to withhold information from public and at same
time balance interest of investor); Richard H. Walker, Report to the President and Congress on the First Year of Practice Under Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995,
in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 234 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Se-
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74
withholding information from the public to protect themselves
from the initiation of strike suits. 7 5 As a result, the market has
returned to its pre-PSLRA condition. 7 6 Companies refuse to
disclose information, leaving the public uninformed. 7 7 This lack
of information hinders the potential for investment in such companies and may have a detrimental effect on the role of the stock
market in general.78

ries No. B4-7199, 1997) (discussing how companies withhold information from public in
fear of being sued).
75 See Miller, supra note 10, at *2-3 (stating shift to state court legislation is undermining primary benefits of 1995 legislation); see also Dawes, supra note 15, at 55
(explaining difficulty to predict effect PSLRA will have on grand scheme of securities litigation); Monroe R. Sonnenborn et. al., An Underwriter and FinancialAdvisor's View of
the Effects of the Safe Harbor and Most Adequate Plaintiff Provisions Since Passage of
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 487 (PLI

Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (describing increase in
state litigation as most significant development since enactment of PSLRA); Growth
Companies Endorse Eshoo - White Bill, Securities Regulation & Law Report, June 27,
1997, available in 29 SRLR 1211, at *1 (reporting that more than 700 entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists strongly support uniform standard legislation to stop threat of abusive suits filed in state courts, such that they may disclose beneficial information to investors); U.S. Newswire, supra note 28, at *2 (discussing chilling effect of frivolous state
lawsuits on overall securities market).
76 See Miller, supra note 10, at *3 (noting that companies and investors are still under threats of abusive litigation since after enactment of PSLRA they now face possibility
of being sued in 50 different states under 50 different laws); see also Litigation Reform:
Congress Targets "Loophole"in 1995 Act Barring Vexatious Suits, Securities Regulation
& Law Report, Aug. 29, 1997 [hereinafter Vexatious Suits], available in 29 SRLR 1211, at
*7 (stating that one frivolous suit filed at state level is enough to deter companies from
disclosing information).
77 See Litigation Reform: Business Leaders Urge Support for Bill to Federalize Securities Class Actions, Securities Regulation & Law Report, Sept. 19, 1997 [hereinafter
Federalize Securities], available in 29 SRLR 1296, at *1 (reporting that leaders of business and high technology organizations, representing more than 25,000 companies are
supporting Securities litigation Uniform Standards Act as means to stop plaintiffs lawyers from filing abusive suits in state courts).
78 See Spencer, supra note 47, at 111. "The threat of opened-ended liability may have
discouraged issuers from disseminating critical market information needed by investors
to make decisions." Id.
79 See SEC Commissioner Wallman Sees Need for Uniform Standards Law, Securities Regulation & Law Report, Sept. 12, 1997, available in 29 SRLR 1259, at *3-4 (noting
that it is not possible to expect information Congress intended as result of Reform Act if
management is still susceptible to lawsuits); see also Miller, supra note 10, at *5 (stating
abusive litigation is costing companies tremendous resources, ultimately affecting integrity of securities market, and since growth companies are faced with possibility of meritless litigation, they continue withholding critical information from investors); Ismini Scoras, Shareholder Lawsuits Target of Legislation - Industry Favors Bills Limiting
Securities Cases Filed in State Courts, Electronic Buyers News, Oct. 13, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 11329877, at *2 (quoting Michael Engelhardt, Vice President of public policy
at Technology Network, as saying that threat of lawsuits is detrimental to capital market
and making it difficult for targeted companies, to raise more money); U.S. Newswire, supra note 28, at *3 (stating that growth in high technology industry is being hindered by
expensive lawsuits).
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II. PROPOSED REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

A. The Improvement Act
In response to the increase of strike suits in state courts, proposals have been set forth in Congress to fill the existing loopholes. The Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997
("Improvement Act") is an expansive bill consisting of remedial
legislation which amends the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 79 It creates
uniform pleading standards for individual stockholders alleging
fraud with respect to federally regulated securities.80 This legislation fills the gaps in the present federal statute so claimants
will no longer be able to access the nearest state court to file a
frivolous claim.
B. The Uniform StandardsAct
Shortly after the proposal of the Improvement Act, a similar,
more narrowly tailored bill, was introduced to Congress entitled,
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997
("Uniform Standards Act"). 81 Its purpose is to preempt securities class action suits based upon fraud.8 2 The underlying purpose of both proposals is the same, except that the Uniform
Standards Act is narrower in scope than the Improvement Act
80 See Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997).
81 See id. This bill amends remedies in securities actions, but for our purposes we are
only discussing the bill in reference to its limitations on state actions. Id. The bill states
that:
[No private civil action alleging (a) a misrepresentation or omission in connection
with the purchase or sale of any covered security, or (b) that the defendant used or
employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of any covered security, may be initiated or maintained in any state
court or any State law (including a pendent state claim to an action under federal
law).
Id.
82 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong.
(1997). The bill was proposed on May 21, 1997 by both Rep. Rick White of Washington,
and Rep. Anna Eshoo of California. Id.
83 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong.
(1997) (amending remedies in securities actions by advocating removal of class actions
brought in any state court involving covered security to federal court); see also Litigation
Reform: White, Eshoo Introduce Securities Bill That Would Federalize Private Class
Suits, Securities Regulation & Law Report, May 23, 1997 [hereinafter White, Eshoo,
available in 29 SRLR 694, at *1 (summarizing new proposed bill that requires securities
class actions involving nationally traded securities to be litigated in federal court following another broader bill introduced by Rep. Tom Campbell).
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83
because it specifically regulates class action suits.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR REFORM LEGISLATION

The pending legislation before Congress is needed in order to
fully effectuate the PSLRA. 8 4 The Uniform Standards Act, in
particular appears to satisfy the need to ensure consistent application of the PSLRA.8 5 Opponents of reform, however, fear that
it is too soon to enact new legislation. 8 6 They argue that federalism will be sacrificed if reforms are implemented and fear that
those with valid fraud claims will have no recourse if plaintiffs
87
are deprived of state court relief.
A. The Need for Reform: ProposedPreemptive Legislation
One of the most fundamental aspects of the PSLRA is the abolition of frivolous lawsuits. However, since attorneys have the
opportunity to file in state courts each company is potentially
84 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong.
(1997).
A class action is any single lawsuit or any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the
same court involving common questions or law or fact, in which - a) damages are
sought on behalf of more than 25 persons; b) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other named
parties similarly situated; or c) one or more of the parties seeking to recover damages did not personally authorize the filing of the lawsuit.
Id.; see also White, Eshoo, supra note 83, at *1. The Uniform Act is narrower than the
Improvement Act because it requires only class actions brought on behalf of more than
25 persons to be brought in federal court. Id.
85 See Vexatious Suits, supra note 76, at *1 (outlining Congressional efforts to curb
meritless securities litigation); see also Congress Tries Again to Stop Frivolous Stock
Fraud Cases, TREASURY MANAGER'S REP., Vol. 5, Issue: 12, June 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8644770, at *1 (noting Congress' attempt to close loophole in PSLRA).
. 86 See generally CongressionalTestimony Before the Subcomm. on Financeand Hazardous Materials Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1997) (written testimony of Bruce
G. Vanyo), available in 1997 WL 14152315, at *6-7. The post-Reform Act litigation is
shifting from federal courts to state courts. Id. This shift threatens to undermine the
PSLRA through nullification of the PSLRA's procedural and substantive protections, as
well as subversion of its heightened pleading standards and discovery stays by filing
parallel class action suits in federal and state courts. Id.
87 See Securities Litigation: Hearings on Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Leonard B. Simon), available in 1997 WL 659251, at *45 (explaining that it is too early to assess effects of Reform Act without any substantial
litigation on matter); Perino, supra note 13, at *3 (stating that it is too early in life history of Act to draw any reliable conclusions).
88 See Laura Weiler, Cities Beware of New Securities Litigation, NATION'S CITIES
WKLY., Aug. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9299509, at *2-3 (noting opponents of uniform legislation argue that defrauded investors might be left without remedy should appellate courts interpret new law in manner making suits under federal law impossible).
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subject to fifty-one different laws. 8 8 In essence, attorneys have
undone the notion of uniformity that the PSLRA attempted to
89
provide.
Given the current state of securities litigation, further reform
is required to prevent attorneys from filing abusive claims in
state courts for the sole purpose of avoiding the requirements
that Congress took great pains to enact in 1995.90 As an answer
to the problem, the Improvement Act and the Uniform Standards
Act preempt these state court claims. 9 1 It is submitted that such
legislation may close the loophole formed in the PSLRA. 9 2
Mandatory preemption of state securities claims is the only
way to resolve the uniformity problem and to fully effectuate the
PSLRA. If one state refuses to enact the standards established
at the federal level, forum shopping will exist to a greater extent
93
than it already does.
Without uniform standards, plaintiffs can choose vertically between federal and state courts, and horizontally from one state
court to another. 9 4 As a result, plaintiffs have been choosing the
89 See Sonnenborn, supra note 75, at 493 (noting increase in number of securities
class actions filed in state court; many of state cases are filed parallel to federal court
cases in apparent attempt to avoid some procedures imposed by Reform Act, particularly
the stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss). See generally Sternman, supra note
67, at 333 (noting results of Stanford study by Joseph Grundfest and Michael A. Perino).
90 See Perino, supra note 13, at *4-7 (noting that attorneys are still seeking relief in
states courts rather than federal courts).
91 See generally Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act: Before the Subcomm. on Securities Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of SEC) [hereinafter Levitt],
availablein 1997 WL 11235194, at *21-22 (noting need for reform).
92 See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 16(c) (1997).
Any class action brought in any state court involving a covered security as set forth
in subsection (b) shall be removable to the federal district court for the district in
which the action is pending and shall be subject to subsection (b). Id. Subsection (b)
provides that, [n]o class action based upon the statutory or common law of any state
of subdivision thereof may be maintained in any state or federal court by any private
party alleging (1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or
employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.
Id.
93 See, e.g., Sternman, supra note 67, at 333 (noting loophole with possibilities of
closing).
94 See Vexatious Suits, supra note 76, at *1 (noting that target of new legislation is
perceived 'loophole' in PSLRA which allegedly still allows plaintiffs to bring frivolous
lawsuits in state courts).
95 See Securities Litigation Reform Bill Expected in the House Shortly, Securities
Regulation & Law Report, May 9, 1997, available in 29 SRLR 637, at *1-2 (noting purpose of proposed reforms to effect uniform standard of rules that closes loopholes thus
allowing PSLRA to reach its full potential).
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forum with the most beneficial rules and regulations pertaining
to their specific cause of action. 9 5 A mandatory transfer from
state court to federal court will unify the law pertaining to securities litigation and therefore, remove the possibility of forum
shopping.

96

Another argument supporting reform of the private securities
litigation field is the role that this area plays upon the integrity
of American capital markets. 9 7 Studies have shown that poor legal enforcement fails to protect investors and may negatively effect the health of the capital markets. 98 Currently corporations
are faced with a double-edged sword when they decide not to
disclose information for fear of being subject to liability because
they are then faced with a shrinking market for capital resources. 9 9 To a company this translates to a loss of potential investors who feel they do not have enough information about the
company to enable them to invest in it. 100
In contrast, if corporations choose to disclose any information,
they expose themselves to litigation that significantly affects
their capital assets. 10 1 The double-edged sword faced by every
96 See U.S. Newswire, supra note 28, at *4 (indicating that number of state and federal laws allow securities lawyers to choose best forum for their abusive lawsuits); see
also Miller, supra note 10, at *9 (stating that securities plaintiffs are taking class actions
to state courts and evading reforms Congress enacted into federal law); Testimony of the
National Venture Capital Association Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Brian Dovey, Pres. of
National Venture Capital Assoc.), available in 1997 WL 414096, at *6 (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers are circumventing reform provision by filing cases in state courts where
federal anti-abuse discovery reforms do not apply); Rice, supra note 63, at 322 (noting
that whether federal procedural rules created by PSLRA or state rules apply in such instances could be decided differently depending on state involved).
97 See Barbara Moses, Securities LitigationReformed?, 29 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES
REG. 37, 41 (1996). A mandatory transfer from state court to federal court will unify securities law and thereby remove the availability of forum shopping. Id.
98 See Olson, supranote 65, at 1101 (stating need to protect markets).
99 See Simon, supra note 87, at *14. "A major 1997 study by scholars' at Harvard
University and the University of Chicago found that: 'Countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of the legal rules and the quality of the law enforcement have smaller and narrower capital markets." Id.
100 See Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 760 (1989) (stating that disclosure of information to public investors provides readier supply of finance capital).
101 See Dale R. Rietberg, Auditor Changes and Opinion Shopping - A Proposed Solution, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 211, 220 (1988) (noting that loss in faith of financial reporting creates problems in capital markets).
102 See generally Dovey, supra note 96, at *3 (noting venture capitalists sitting on
board of directors of large percentage of corporations know problems these corporations
face in regard to continuance of securities class action suits).
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corporation in deciding whether or not to disclose information
seems to repel potential investors regardless of the choice made.
Losing investors may slow the growth of these companies because it takes away a valuable source of capital. 10 2 In addition
to the loss of possible new investors, a company may also lose its
own money by defending these meritless claims either through
litigation or by settling outside of court. 10 3 The cost of defending
these suits are twofold, in that companies are expending money
for their defense while losing a source of capital. 104 Instead of
wasting money on these suits, the money could have been reinvested, paid in dividends, or utilized in other ways to benefit the
company. 10 5 Each of these situations has a detrimental effect on
the overall securities market which could be easily rectified by
uniformity among the courts.
B. Arguments Against Reform
The first argument against reform is that the PSLRA has not
had an opportunity to work itself out. 10 6 The PSLRA has only
been subjected to limited judicial review. 10 7 Taking this into account, opponents of remedial legislation feel it is too soon to en08
act changes. 1
103 See id.
104 See Matteson, supra note 48, at 548 (highlighting fact that strike suits cost U.S.
companies more than 2.5 billion dollars in settlements in last 4 years).
105 See Seligman, supra note 44, at 721 (noting frequency of out of court settlements
related to securities litigation).
106 See Hamilton, supra note 66, at 616 (discussing corporations wasting money on
strike suits instead of using money to benefit company).
107 See Levitt, supra note 91, at *3-4 (stating that Reform Act is still in its infancy
and therefore has not had enough practical experience to produce data necessary to
measure its success or failure).
108 See Latham, supra note 32, at 1477 n.4 (stating few published opinions can be
found addressing disputes arising under PSLRA); see also Rice, supra note 63, at 283
(PSLRA has not yet been fully tested in courts); SEC Adopts Staff Conclusion, No Legislative Changes Now Needed, Securities Regulation & Law Report, April 18, 1997, available in 29 SRLR 523, at *1 (stating that proposed 1997 legislation is "preemptive" since
full effects of PSLRA are still unknown). But see Perino, supra note 13, at *1-2
(concluding that regardless of uncertainties surrounding PSLRA, time is ripe for Congress to act).
109 See Simon, supra note 87, at *4. The SEC is not alone in its opinion that legislative response to the PSLRA is premature. Id. Professor Joseph A. Grundfest argues that
because the PSLRA is still in its infancy and has not been tested within the courts, it is
too early to gauge its success or failure and therefore would be premature to initiate additional legislation. Id. Moreover, the American Assoc. of Retired Persons, Consumer
Federation of America, Consumers Union, Public Citizens Congress Watch, U.S. Public
Interest Research Group, and Citizen Action further insist that Congress should wait
until it has conclusive evidence of how litigation reform has affected the ability of de-
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Opponents are equally concerned about the potential abuse of
federalism. 10 9 "States have historically been given the power to
protect state and local government funds and their taxpayers,
regardless of the obstacles present in federal law. Preemption of
this state authority would be contrary to the principals of federalism which reserves to the states those powers." 110
Moreover, opponents argue that the passage of new legislation
advocating the automatic transfer from state courts to federal
courts will leave valid claims without a proper forum. 1 1 1 Since
1995, the requirements to get into federal court have been raised
to a higher standard. 1 12 There are, however, some situations
where valid claims do not meet the heightened standard and
therefore, rely on state courts to settle their claims. 1 13 Eliminating the possibility of state court hearings will leave some legitimate claimants without the possibility of legal redress. 1 14 A
fundamental component of the United States legal system is that
each person has a right to their day in court. 1 15 To take that
right away from a certain group of people undermines our judi16
cial system. 1
In response to this fear, it is important to note that our judicial
frauded investors to recover their losses. Id.
110 See Simon, supra note 87, at *7-8 (noting that preemption of state authority
would be contrary to principles of federalism); see also Vexatious Suits, supra note 76, at
*3-4 (noting that opponents of reform as SEC, National Association of Securities and
Commercial Law Attorneys, an array of consumer groups and state and local government
organizations raising federalism arguments).
III See Simon, supra note 87, at *7-8 (noting federalism issues). But see Perino, supro note 13, at *32-33 (arguing that neither bill is intended to limit scope of state's
authority to bring lawsuits alleging violations of state law).
112 See Simon, supra note 87, at *40-41 (arguing that legitimate claimants will be
without legal remedy should recoveries become impossible in federal court under proposed legislation); see also Dawes, supra note 15, at 37 (mentioning effects on plaintiffs
ability to bring suit).
113 See Panelists Dispute Reform Law's Impact on Private Class Securities Fraud
Litigation, Securities Regulation & Law Report, Aug. 15, 1997, available in 29 SRLR
1134, at *2 (noting generally heightened pleading standards required by the PSLRA); see
also Lerach, supra note 60, at 931 (discussing heightened pleading standard of PSLRA).
114 See Simon, supra note 87, at *4 (suggesting that judicial interpretations of
PSLRA might make it all but impossible to bring even meritorious fraud claims successfully in federal court).
115 See id.
116 See St. Joseph's Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1935)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that supremacy of law demands opportunity to have
court decide whether erroneous rule of law was applied).
117 See Christopher D. Knopf, One Law Battle: Reform of the Veterans Administration of Claims Procedure, 74 VA. L. REV. 937, 937 (1988) (stating that denial of plaintiffs
day in court constitutes deprivation of fundamental right of American judicial system).

1998]

THE NEEDFOR REFORM

system is also based on the premise that a trial is a search for
the truth. 1 17 Standards and requirements for different proceedings are established in order to find the truth in a manner which
is fair to both parties. 118 The standards were raised in federal
courts in 1995 because legislators felt that a higher standard
was needed to uphold justice for plaintiffs and defendants
alike. 1 19 There is nothing unfair in bringing all cases up to the
standard which was considered appropriate in 1995.120
CONCLUSION

Securities regulations have been altered and reformed
throughout time as deemed necessary. 12 1 Once again it has become clear that reform is necessary for the securities market to
function effectively. A primary focus of the proposed legislation
discussed herein is to establish a uniform standard for securities
litigation. In doing so, several necessary reforms will be accomplished. A uniform standard will not only set precedent, but
put investors on notice of the requirements necessary to successfully plead a valid fraud claim. Furthermore, companies will
have definite standards on which they can base their forward
looking statements. Such standards will remove the fears currently instilled in companies as a result of the meritless lawsuits
previously permitted. The final benefit of creating a uniform
standard is the prevention of forum shopping. Examination of
all the benefits of a uniform standard clearly demonstrate the
need for such reform.
Michael P. Catina& Cindy M. Schmitt

118 See J. Alexander Tanford et. al., Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist - Lawyer Collaboration,66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 762 (1988) (stating that trials are
search for truth); see also Hon. Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40
VAND. L. REV. 271, 280 (1987) (describing trial as search for truth).
119 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (trial courts must take necessary steps to provide fair trial).

120 The standards uphold justice for defendants because only true cases of fraud
should get in, while potential plaintiffs are protected by the required disclosure.
121 Id.
122 See Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions be Required in All Securities Arbitrations: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 151, 176 (1995) (stating that federal securities laws are constantly evolving).

